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Abstract. Crowdsourcing has been widely leveraged for the tagging of video
material; recently this has included the monitoring of surveillance video footage.
However, the relative advantages and disadvantages of crowdsourcing watchers
of surveillance video are not well articulated, nor has there been any significant
work on the efficacy of different tools for retrospective surveillance. In this paper
we explore factors that might affect crowd performance on video surveillance
monitoring tasks. We firstly established a baseline for crowd performance in a
‘live’ surveillance study before comparing two different interfaces that allowed
retrospective discovery of the same events (Scrub Player and Panopticon). Using
MTurk, we asked 474 people to monitor two types of CCTV footage containing
different levels of extraneous activity for ‘events’ using these two interfaces. We
also manipulated bonus payments. We found that the crowd was most accurate
when watching the video that contained the least extraneous activity, that there
was no effect of financial incentive on the reporting of true events, but that there
was some indication that higher bonus payments generated more false alarms. We
also found an effect of interface: those using the Panopticon interface processed
more video footage and generated more alerts, but were less accurate overall. We
discuss the implications of different interface designs, video types, and incentive
schemes when crowdsourcing watchers of surveillance video.
Keywords: Crowdsourcing; CCTV; Surveillance.
1 Introduction
Surveillance is a subject that fuels debate, particularly in technologically advanced so-
cieties, where citizen behaviours can be monitored by a highly diverse network of sys-
tems and devices. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is often considered the archetypal
surveillance technology, used for both the deterrence of crime and as a means of pro-
viding evidence in criminal prosecution. This technology is used worldwide, however,
countries such as the United Kingdom appear to be peerless in commitment to CCTV;
some estimates suggest that 4 million cameras are deployed there [21]. The public per-
ception of CCTV as an omniscient force in society is thought to mask an unwieldy
organisational machine that is highly dependent upon a technology infrastructure that
is costly to maintain, and upon security staff paid to watch the video footage: generally
2low paid, under-appreciated, overloaded with other tasks, and fighting extreme levels of
boredom [25].
A number of initiatives have been proposed to reduce the reliance upon human
labour for event detection in live or archived surveillance video, with many of these in-
volving sophisticated video analytics or machine learning techniques [19]. In parallel,
web platforms have emerged that incorporate crowdsourcing, or human computation
[29], in the analysis of live footage streamed online. Those recruited are asked to watch
surveillance footage and report any notable events to a relevant authority via the user
interface. The principal assumption underlying this approach is that a large, sponta-
neous, and distributed workforce can analyse footage as effectively as a dedicated team
of professionals. A number of high profile web platforms work in this way to achieve
different goals, for instance, monitoring for evidence of illegal immigration via a video
feed from the US/Mexico border [27] as well as routine anti-theft surveillance in gro-
cery stores in the UK [13]. Yet, little is known about the deployment of crowdsourcing
platforms in this space, nor about the design and reward factors that might influence the
performance of a remote and distributed workforce.
In this paper we attempt to understand more about the event detection capability
of the crowd across both live and archive video surveillance tasks. There has been rel-
atively little crowdsourcing work on the latter, despite the fact that the monitoring of
archived surveillance footage is a huge problem in crime detection [19] and its absence
in the research literature is particularly surprising given the established use of crowd-
sourcing in the annotation of archived video [31]. We seek to redress this problem in
a study in which we first establish baseline performance in a live surveillance task and
secondly, compare two platforms for video archive surveillance under a number of dif-
ferent conditions. Our specific contributions are:
– An investigation of the performance of a spontaneously recruited online commu-
nity asked to monitor surveillance video, conducted under a set of manipulations
that allow comparison between (i) different video types (live vs archived; simple vs
complex); (ii) different interfaces for video viewing and navigation and (iii) differ-
ent incentive schemes (variable rates of pay).
– The application of a video surrogate interface in a more strenuous surveillance
video monitoring context than had previously been attempted (Panopticon [14]).
2 Related Work
2.1 Understanding CCTV
In the UK, deployment of CCTV in public spaces is thought to have been first adopted
as a political tool to provide a visible response to worrying levels of crime. Its ac-
tual efficacy as a crime prevention tool has been disputed [7] as there are a number of
confounding factors that make it impossible to assume a simple relationship between
CCTV deployment and the overall crime rate [2]. Nonetheless, as Tullio et al. [30] note,
CCTV typically forms part of a complex evidence system in which the over-riding le-
gal need is to be able to make more effective use of the footage that is captured. This
3is problematic given the volume of data generated by cameras. Indeed, it has been sug-
gested that our ability to gather video surveillance footage has not been matched by the
ability to process all the data that is generated [22]. Surette [28] points out that a typical
20 camera setup that records 24 hours per day will generate 480 hours of video, and
43 million images per day. The appropriate and timely analysis of this material is an
onerous task for control room staff.
A number of ethnographic studies have aimed to understand the context of work for
CCTV operators; such studies show that the control room is a complex workplace that
can, in itself, affect the intended security gains. Smith [26] carried out an ethnographic
study of security staff at an educational establishment in the UK and found that the se-
curity personnel felt bored and undervalued. They were also seen to adopt practices to
combat boredom – practices that conflicted with their need to judiciously monitor visual
displays for suspicious behavior (e.g. focusing cameras on their own vehicles, playing
hide and seek) [25]. In a further ethnographic study that explored the relationship be-
tween watchers and watched in the control room, Smith noted that watchers can develop
a perceived rapport with individuals they have never met, but repeatedly see on-screen
and develop empathy with them over the longer term [26]. Given some of the problems
outlined here with the use of computational video analytics within the legal system, it
not surprising that there is a move to consider crowdsourcing as one cost-effective so-
lution to processing the large volumes of data gathered. In the sections below, we give
some background to the use of crowd-based classification of video material, including
considerations of the design factors that maximise crowd performance, before turning
to some examples of the use of crowdsourcing in video surveillance.
2.2 Improving the Performance of the Crowd
There has recently been a move towards a greater understanding of crowdsourcing,
with the recognition that both worker incentives [5, 23, 20, 16] and task interfaces [8]
can have a significant impact upon participation rates and performance from workers
sourced online.
Bespoke interfaces can optimise the performance of the crowd across a range of
task types, such as video annotation [30, 31], short video filtering [3], speech captioning
[17], and even word processing [2]. The interfaces most pertinent to the task of crowd
surveillance of CCTV footage are those that have been developed for video annotation.
These interfaces typically use a simple timeline interface with additional features to
support the annotation process (e.g. predetermined tag displays, ability to mark objects
on the video, etc.). However, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have explicitly
addressed the design and/or performance of different video navigation interfaces in a
task that asks crowd workers to search for events within video material. That said, we
can learn from Lasecki et al. [17] who demonstrates that allowing the crowd workers to
control the media (in this case the speed of the audio) significantly improved their task
efficiency.
The literature on incentives for crowd workers is more contradictory. For exam-
ple, Kazai [16] reported that a straightforward financial bonus improved the quality of
participants’ work – similar to [11]’s findings. In contrast, [20] found that financial in-
centive increased participation, but did not improve the quality of the work done. Note
4too, that new work on intrinsic motivation (e.g. framing a task as a social benefit or an
altruistic act) suggests that this may be more effective than pay in actually improving
output quality [22].
2.3 Crowdsourcing and Video Surveillance
The Texas Border Watch [4] program invited watchers from all over the world to moni-
tor live surveillance feeds from one particular stretch of the border between the United
States and Mexico. There were known problems with drug trafficking and illegal immi-
gration on that border and so local residents were invited to place cameras on their own
property to contribute a video feed to a central website. Alarms raised by the crowd
on the user interface were then sent to an appropriate border Sheriff. During deploy-
ment, 26 arrests were made and around 7,400 pounds of narcotics were seized in two
years, which worked out at a cost of $153,800 per arrest based on the initial financial
investment [10]. Internet Eyes [13] was a private company in the UK that aggregated
CCTV from grocery stores and distributed the feeds on their web platform. Each alarm
raised by users on the user interface would be sent directly to the management of the
grocery store. Watchers were offered the promise of financial rewards if they were able
to spot incidences of shoplifting. To preserve privacy, the site claimed to ensure that
users would not be able to watch CCTV video from their local area, nor discover where
the feed was based. This site appears quite unique in its provision of a particularly
voyeuristic experience; the service has an active presence on social networking sites,
where watchers discussed recent events seen on camera.
The Shoreditch Digital Bridge [18] was a government funded project in 2006 based
in London, UK. This transmitted feeds from 11 local CCTV cameras directly to the
televisions of local residents. The feed was accompanied by a ”rogues gallery” which
comprised a picture slideshow of individuals in the area with anti-social behaviour or-
ders attached. Residents were not provided with a means to interact with the videos, and
any alarms that needed to be raised had to be done so by telephone to the police. This
configuration also has a particular voyeuristic appeal as residents were given license to
monitor their local communities. Indeed, local reports of graffiti and vandalism were
increased by 600% and 200% respectively. It is not clear whether the local constab-
ulary had the capacity or capability to respond to these additional reports of criminal
behaviour. The project attracted a number of privacy and civil liberties concerns.
Our own study was motivated by a desire to understand more about the factors
affecting crowd participation, engagement and performance within a surveillance con-
text. We carried out two experiments: the first configuration comprised a fairly standard
deployment where watchers are presented with a continuous feed of seemingly live
video; the second explored the efficacy of two different interfaces, both designed to im-
prove performance in video event-detection. In each study we investigated two further
factors, manipulating the complexity of the video watched (in terms of number of dis-
tractor events taking place) and the level of financial incentive offered to the workers.
On the basis of related work on video search, we believed: (i) that participants would
find it difficult to sustain attention and interest in the process of monitoring live video
footage; (ii) that event detection was likely to be easier and more accurate in the simple
video task; (iii) that reward may lead to workers spending more time on task but would
5Fig. 1. The user interface for Experiment 1, where the surveillance video is presented as being
a live stream. Participants were asked to click ’Alert’ once an on-screen occurrence that met
the specified criteria was observed. Video frames that the user selected as being significant were
displayed along the bottom of the screen.
not necessarily improve performance and (iv) that there would be an effect of inter-
face, with the new Panopticon system being more effective in facilitating the process of
finding events of interest, leading to superior surveillance performance [14].
3 Experiment 1 - Live Video Surveillance
The first user study addressed real-time, seemingly live, surveillance. This configuration
is comparable to how the majority of the exemplar platforms have been instantiated.
We know that watching video footage in real time can be tedious, and so our research
aim was to understand how variations in financial reward and video type might affect
performance. We used Amazon MTurk as the platform, as it provided us with a suitably
wide user base.
4 Method
Our first study was a 2 (video type) x 3 (incentive level) independent design and the
dependent measures were the amount of video watched, user precision and recall, and
a complementary measure of false positive interactions.
4.1 Task Materials
We constructed two videos to resemble CCTV footage for the basis of our studies (see
Figure 2). These two videos were chosen to represent two quite different surveillance
6Fig. 2. Extracts from the two surveillance videos that we constructed. Top: a lab context where the
images were mostly static providing a particularly tedious viewing experience; bottom: the uni-
versity bikesheds, a busy area that is already heavily covered by CCTV. Screens on the right side
illustrate example events where watchers should raise an alarm (yellow circles are illustrative).
tasks that appear to conceptually represent those seen in our earlier review of existing
platforms of this nature, according to the level of activity they contain:
– Lab video: Participants were asked to monitor the entrance to a laboratory and
asked to raise an alarm when any person walked through the door. This relatively
static footage relied purely upon a reactionary response from the user. No extrane-
ous events occur. We refer to this as a simple video.
– Bikes video: Participants were asked to monitor an outdoor area of high public traf-
fic on the university campus that was already heavily monitored by CCTV cameras.
On the footage, people can be seen to regularly add and remove bikes from the bike
shed or simply walk by. Participants were asked to raise an alarm whenever a bike
was legitimately taken or returned to the bike shed. This task therefore required a
more nuanced interpretation of the behaviour of the people on-screen. We refer to
this as a complex video.
The video type likely plays the most important role to influence a number of per-
formance parameters for watchers, and we hoped that the differences between our two
videos could be sufficient to help us to gauge the significance and focus of this influ-
ence. There is currently no empirical data to guide our intuition in this regard for a
surveillance context.
While we presented the scenario that the viewed video was a live feed, both videos
were 2 hours long and contained the same number of true positive actionable events (20)
with the distribution approximately balanced through editing. The videos contained no
sound and their natural size was 352x288 pixels. We assigned each ‘event’ in the video
a time period within which a click would be accepted as a useful alarm for purposes of
assessing the accuracy of watchers. Our study design passed ethical review and there
were no special measures that we were required to implement.
74.2 Procedure
We firstly posted a HIT on the MTurk website advertising a video monitoring task.
There we outlined the basics of the study and the criteria for payment. All participants
who watched 15 minutes of video would qualify for a small base payment (to provide
criteria for MTurk work completion). Once the participant decided to accept the task
they were redirected to a website on our own web server, at which point we randomly
assigned one of the three incentive conditions: no incentive – participants could only
earn a small base payment ($0.40) no matter how hard they worked, low incentive –
participants could earn $0.05 for every event that they identified that we later verified,
or high incentive – where participants could earn $0.25 for every event they identified
that we later verified. The participants were not made aware of other bonus or reward
schemes other than the one to which they had been assigned, and were not told how
many events were present in the video.
Before viewing the video, participants were also provided with a simple visual ex-
ample of an event that they were searching for (that resembled Figure 2). We invited
them to watch as much of the 2 hour video as they wished. We developed a simple
web-based interface resembling the Texas Border Watch website that provided users
with instructions, the video feed, and a button underneath that read “Alert” (see Fig-
ure 2). We asked participants to ”watch the video and report any events they felt were
relevant by pressing the alert button situated below the player window”. The definition
of an “event” was always present on-screen and differed according to the video type,
along with information of any bonus entitlement. Simple steps were taken to present the
impression this was a ‘live feed’: firstly, no playback controls were present on the inter-
face, which also masked any video length detail on the interface, secondly, a clock (to
give an impression of local time) was overlaid onto the video feed, and thirdly, cookies
remembered playback positions for the case that participants navigated away from the
site during the task (which was logged).
4.3 Participants
In total, 114 participants completed this phase of the study and were included in the
main analysis. The composition of the recruited participants was 65% male and 35%
female. There were a number of participants who started the study but who did not
watch the required 15 minutes of video to receive the baseline payment and were not
included in the main analysis (unless otherwise stated). There were 27 participants who
did not watch the required 15 minutes for the simple video task, and 30 for the complex
video task.
4.4 Results
The analyses are presented in the way of independent 2x3 ANOVAs for the main com-
parisons. We found that the data was not normally distributed, but there was enough
variance in the data to mirror the results from non-parametric tests while also capturing
any possible interaction effects. We present the results for time engagement, and user
accuracy. In the former, our significance testing was focused upon the amount of video
8analysed by participants, and in the latter this was focused upon accuracy as described
by an F1 score. Other measures are also given to provide descriptive statistics.
4.5 Time Engaged on Task
The prime engagement measure was the time spent by participants watching their as-
signed video. This is the only analysis that includes those participants who completed
less than the required minimum of 15 minutes on task. A 2 (video type: simple, com-
plex) x 3 (incentive: none, low, high) ANOVA revealed no main effect of video type,
(F (1, 108) = 1.108, p = 0.295), and no main effect of incentiveF (1, 108) = 1.978, p =
0.143). We observed no interaction between video and bonus (F (2, 108) = 1.365, p =
0.260). This suggests that the time spent on the task was neither influenced by com-
plexity of the video itself nor the bonus structure.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the accuracy and time engagement recorded from participants in
Experiment 1. The lab video in the ’live’ study is represented in the top table, and the bikes video
in the bottom table.
Bonus n
Mins of Video Precision Recall F1
(µ) (µ) (µ) (µ)
$0 19 16 0.92 0.63 0.73
$0.05 19 24 0.85 0.84 0.8
$0.25 19 25 0.7 0.67 0.71
Total 57 22 0.85 0.71 0.75
Bonus n
Mins of Video Precision Recall F1
(µ) (µ) (µ) (µ)
$0 18 16 0.76 0.7 0.73
$0.05 19 16 0.56 0.62 0.61
$0.25 20 26 0.58 0.52 0.54
Total 57 19 0.63 0.62 0.63
4.6 Accuracy
Table 1 presents a summary of participant accuracy using metrics common to infor-
mation retrieval: precision and recall. Precision reflects the number of events correctly
identified as a proportion of the total number of events identified (both true hits and
false alarms), whereas recall reflects the number of true events identified as a propor-
tion of the total number of true events available on the video. The harmonic mean of
these two measures produces an F1 score 3 - where an F1 score of 1 indicates best pos-
sible performance and a score of 0 indicates worst possible performance. Using these
3 The F1 score can be considered as a weighted average of precision and recall. F1 =
2( precision∗recall
precision+recall
)
9Fig. 3. Left: the overall false alarm rates calculated from users of the live interface, separated by
video and bonus condition; right: the mean time period that the video was watched in minutes
(error bars represent 95% confidence intervals).
F1 scores in a 2 (video complexity: simple, complex) x 3 (incentive: none, low, high)
ANOVA, we found a main effect of video type with workers being more accurate when
watching the simple video (F (1, 89) = 4.450, p = .038). There was no main effect
of incentive on accuracy, (F (2, 89) = 0.909, p = 0.407) nor was there an interaction
between video and bonus (F (2, 89) = 1.362, p = .262).
We should note here that false alarms (clicks made to signal an alert where no
relevant event was actually present) are a particular concern in a real deployment as each
click must potentially be acted upon by a human i.e. there is a genuine cost-per-event
identified. While the metric of precision does take into account false alarms generated
by users, we also conducted an analysis for the false alarms generated in each condition.
Figure 3 illustrates the false alarm rate calculated across all participants and would
suggest that the false positive rate increases with the bonus. However, a 2 (Video type)
x 3 (Incentive) ANOVA performed on the false alarm data revealed only a significant
effect of video type (F (1, 89) = 9.968, p = 0.002) such that more false alarms were
recorded on the bikes video.
5 Summary
In the first user study we attempted to understand how crowdsourced workers would
perform when given the task of analysing live surveillance video. This is against the
backdrop of all known infrastructures adopting this method of presenting video to users.
We gained a number of interesting insights:
– Video type had no effect on engagement, but we had a large number of dropouts
overall
– Accuracy varied with video type: workers were more accurate when watching the
simple video, as predicted.
– Financial incentives had no significant effect upon either the amount of video par-
ticipants were prepared to analyse, nor their accuracy.
– Increasing financial incentives superficially appeared to increase the number of
false alarms generated, although this effect was not significant (see Figure 3).
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Fig. 4. Panopticon is a video surrogate system that represents an overview of the frames of a video
in a grid configuration. Each tile in the grid represents a moving section of video.
6 Experiment 2 - Archived Video Surveillance
In this second study, we recruited a different set of crowd workers and asked them to
discover events in fixed length sections of video; a situation representing retrospective
surveillance. We introduced two different interfaces to view the same two surveillance
videos we used in Experiment 1. This meant that watchers were free to navigate sections
of the video and be proactive in their searches for the events we specified.
7 Method
The study consisted of a 2 (interface) x 2 (video type) x 3 (incentive level) indepen-
dent design with dependent measures again reflecting engagement (time on task) and
participant accuracy calculated from measures of precision, recall, and F1.
7.1 Task Materials
Although the video footage was identical to that used in Experiment 1, for this study
each video was cut into 15 minute segments (creating 8 sub-videos) with each segment
searchable using one of the two experimental interfaces.
Given the novelty of Panopticon, participants assigned to that condition were guided
through a fast step-by-step guide of its features and its interaction possibilities. Once
the participant had clicked through the three dialogue boxes detailing the functionality
of Panopticon, they were able to start the study.
7.2 Procedure
The procedure differed slightly from the previous study, as participants were firstly
given an introduction to their assigned video navigation interface and then asked to use
11
this interface to analyse as many video segments as they wished. Base payment was
conditional upon them having monitored at least one 15 minute sub-video.
7.3 Participants
We recruited 359 participants through MTurk (58% male, 42% female). 181 participants
took part using Panopticon while the other 178 used Scrub-Player. There were 2 drop-
outs for the Scrub-Player condition, and 7 from the Panopticon group (they did not start
the first video).
8 Results
As with the first experiment, we analyzed the performance of the crowd through mea-
surements of time engagement and participant accuracy. In the former, our significance
testing was focused upon the number of minutes of video analysed by participants, and
in the latter this was focused upon accuracy as described by an F1 score.
8.1 Time Engaged on Task
We found a main effect of interface. Participants using Scrub-Player spent less time
watching video than those using Panopticon (F (1, 353) = 36.827, p < .001). We also
found a main effect of video type, such that participants assigned to watch the simple lab
video watched for longer than those watching the complex bikes video (F (1, 353) =
13.788, p < .001). We found no main effect of financial incentive on the time spent
analysing video, (F (2, 353) = 0.298, p = .742).
We found a significant interaction between interface and video (F (1, 353) = 5.436, p =
.020) where Panopticon users spent significantly longer on task for the simple videos
compared to the more complex videos and completed more tasks (t(185) = 3.869, p <
.001). This was not true for Scrub-Player users, where no significant effect of video
was found (t(176) = 1.335, p = .184). No significant two-way interaction effects were
found between interface and bonus (F (2, 353) = 0.048, p = .953), video and bonus
(F (2, 353) = 1.211, p = .299), nor was there a three way interaction between interface,
video and bonus (F (2, 353) = 0.030, p = .970).
Figures 3 and 5 illustrate the range of time spent across each video and incentive
condition and illustrates confidence intervals. In the case of workers receiving no finan-
cial incentive (for either video) they would watch on average for 16 minutes. In this
study, time spent on task does not equate to the number of minutes of video that were
analysed. The additional time on task translates into a higher mean number of minutes
of video analysed for users of the Panopticon system, as indicated in Tables 2 and 3.
8.2 Accuracy
Again, our primary measure of accuracy was the F1 score derived from measures of
precision and recall. We found that participants using Scrub-Player were more accurate
12
Fig. 5. Left: the overall false alarm rates calculated from users of the Panopticon interface sepa-
rated by each video and bonus condition; right: the mean time period that participants spent on
the task in minutes (error bars represent 95% confidence intervals).
than those using Panopticon (F (1, 259) = 13.614, p < .001). We also found that par-
ticipants viewing the simple lab video had a significantly higher F1 score than those
viewing the complex bikes video (F (1, 259) = 40.986, p < .001). We found no effect
of incentive on accuracy (F (2, 259) = 0.396, p = .674).
We were interested in exploring this data further – again looking at the issue of false
alarms. We found a significant main effect of interface (F (1, 259) = 4.031; p = .045)
with more false alarms made when using Panopticon as compared to Scrub Player; a
significant main effect of video (F (1, 259) = 21.995; p < .001) with more false alarms
made to the complex video; a marginal effect of bonus (F (2, 259 = 2.674; p = .070)
with greater levels of pay leading to more false alarms (see Figure 5) and a marginal
interaction between video and bonus (F (2, 353) = 2.767; p = .064), such that the
performance ‘cost’ of paying high bonus rates is most apparent for workers engaged in
the simple lab task.
9 Summary
In this second study we modelled the task of workers who must search archived footage
and can, consequently, employ video search tools to improve efficiency. We introduced
two such tools or interfaces: the first was a standard Scrub-Player that allows rapid
fast-forward and backward scanning in a video task; the second, Panopticon was a new
system, shown to be more effective than a scrub player in a series of video search tasks
[15]. We had predicted that Panopticon would be more effective in supporting video
surveillance searching, but our findings were more nuanced – Panopticon users watched
more footage, with the result that they found more events, but accuracy was poorer than
with the standard Scrub-Player and workers made more false alarms, particularly when
watching the complex video when event detection was relatively poor. We found no
overall effect of financial incentive, however there was some indication in the complex
video case that bonus payments can simply lead to the production of more false alarms,
particularly when workers are presented with uneventful video.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the accuracy of participants using Panopticon to watch: (top) the
lab video and (bottom) the bikes video.
Bonus n
Mins of Video Precision Recall F1
(µ) (µ) (µ) (µ)
$0 29 67.5 0.73 0.72 0.69
$0.05 29 57 0.72 0.64 0.67
$0.25 31 60 0.67 0.64 0.66
Total 89 61.5 0.71 0.67 0.67
Bonus n
Mins of Video Precision Recall F1
(µ) (µ) (µ) (µ)
$0 33 40.5 0.53 0.37 0.46
$0.05 30 42 0.56 0.4 0.47
$0.25 29 42 0.33 0.28 0.26
Total 92 41.5 0.47 0.35 0.4
10 Discussion
There is a perception that streaming surveillance video to online platforms is a lazy
method to obtain security that can only serve to harden the prejudices that exist in soci-
ety. For instance, it is already known that in the traditional delivery of CCTV video to
the control room that the attention of watchers does not fall equally upon all people [25].
Ethnographic studies of CCTV control rooms have suggested that cameras are particu-
larly drawn to minority groups, such as homeless people; archetypes of Bauman’s failed
consumers [1]. While the discussion of privacy must happen in more detail elsewhere,
our endeavour was to study the performance parameters of opportunistically recruited
members of the crowd on the task of monitoring surveillance video. To these ends, we
have carried out two studies assessing the feasibility of using a crowdsourcing platform
to detect events in CCTV surveillance video. We presented both live and archived video
footage and investigated two factors likely to impact the performance of the crowd: in-
terface type and incentive scheme in order to learn more about the efficacy of using the
crowd for video surveillance work. Our discussion reflects the insights generated from
these empirical studies and includes suggestions for future work.
10.1 Live vs Archived Video
The live video stream in isolation appeared to poorly engage the crowd workers. A
large number of participants did not complete the basic unit of work that we specified;
possibly due to the open-ended nature of the task, i.e. there was no foreseeable end to
the task, nor were there any significant milestones. We already know that those em-
ployed to monitor live video feeds find this task onerous and experience high levels
of boredom [25], and so we would argue that where circumstances allow, a retrospec-
tive search of archived material is preferable. However, where there remains a need
for watchers to monitor video surveillance in ‘real time’, it might be useful to develop
14
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the accuracy of participants using the Scrub-Player to watch:
(top) the lab video; (bottom) the bikes video.
Bonus n
Mins of Video Precision Recall F1
(µ) (µ) (µ) (µ)
$0 31 37.5 0.83 0.69 0.73
$0.05 29 27 0.81 0.64 0.79
$0.25 28 34.5 0.85 0.75 0.84
Total 88 33 0.83 0.68 0.79
Bonus n
Mins of Video Precision Recall F1
(µ) (µ) (µ) (µ)
$0 30 25.5 0.7 0.69 0.63
$0.05 32 30 0.72 0.6 0.61
$0.25 28 28.5 0.46 0.56 0.5
Total 90 28.5 0.63 0.62 0.43
efficient algorithms that separate the crowd into those monitoring real-time footage,
and those conducting retrospective analysis to double-check alarms raised (a technique
quite commonly used in citizen science [24]).
10.2 Interface Design
We noted that participants using Panopticon analysed significantly more video than
those using the Scrub-Player. They also raised more correct alarms in total, but were
less accurate overall due to the tendency to raise more false alarms as well. We believe
the relative visual complexity of the Panopticon interface (particularly given workers’
lack of familiarity with that system) contributed to a higher rate of false alarms and
lower levels of accuracy. The Scrub-Player provided a simpler, more familiar interface
and resulted in a significantly higher F1 (accuracy) score, but this interface does require
intricate motor skills. Therefore, designers should consider both the costs and benefits
of increasing the complexity of user interfaces applied to the task. Image processing
techniques could also be used to support the selection of segments of footage for further
analysis by a bespoke interface [6, 19].
10.3 Task Complexity
We noted a significant effect of the video type in both studies which suggests that the
characteristics of the surveillance video can significantly impact the quality of work
that can be expected from the crowd. This affects our consideration of the most appro-
priate user interfaces to support crowd work. In tasks monitoring both live and archived
video footage, accuracy dropped for the more complex video. We received messages,
generated by watchers of the bikes video that showed they were trying to indicate ways
in which other events might have been of interest e.g. “The truck is in the way of the
15
Fig. 6. Left: the overall false alarm rates calculated from watchers of each video and bonus con-
dition for the Scrub-Player; right: the mean time period that participants spent on the task (error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals).
camera!”, “...those builders are just hanging around, they need to get back to work”.
However, none of the interfaces we provided were sufficiently expressive to enable such
concerns to be distinguished from critical events. For complex videos, facilitating dif-
ferent types of alerts could create a more engaging eco-system for crowd workers, so
that their efforts still feel valued even if such extra information is not considered nec-
essary. It may, however, help to disaggregate the valuable from non-valuable alarms,
particularly in videos that could generate a prohibitive number of false alarms.
10.4 Financial Incentives
We noted a limited impact of the per-event bonus offered to participants across both user
studies, and we even found marginal effects where higher bonus payments led to lower
accuracy. Initially, it seems surprising that bonuses failed to incentivise participants on
a platform like Mechanical Turk where the main focus of the participant is thought
to be on earning rather than engaging [12]. This also runs contrary to literature that
shows financial incentives can lead to better performance in resume rating [11] and
web searching [16] scenarios. However, our results fit more closely with other work
[20] that has suggested that payment only improves the quantity of responses from
the crowd, without any benefit to the quality of work returned. Indeed some studies
involving real world scenarios have even shown where money was offered as reward
for a normally volunteer-based activity, paying for the volunteers time actually reduced
the number of hours on average a participant contributed [9]. Of course, it might just be
that our bonuses were not sufficiently attractive to influence participation or accuracy.
Overall, our findings suggest that, in this surveillance context, there is a delicate balance
to be considered between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
10.5 Identifying Genuine ‘Alarms’
An inflated false alarm rate is a debilitating matter in a world of online CCTV platforms;
without a sensible way to identify genuine alarms, each signalled ’event’ needs to be
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Fig. 7. The overall distribution of alerts raised by experiment participants using: (i) live interface;
(ii) Scrub-Player; (iii) Panopticon. Each graph is split by bonus scheme and video type. Each
circle indicates an alert raised during the 2 hour surveillance video. A greater clustering of circles
indicates higher concentration of alerts raised during that time period (7200 seconds = 2 hours).
propagated up the chain of command. In our experiments we already knew where in
the video the genuine events were to be found. This begs a question of whether crowd-
sourced analysis should be done at the level of the individual worker, or whether a group
of workers should be tasked to search the same video, in which case the crowd work-
ing in concert should create reliable spikes of activity when genuine events are present.
Figure 7 illustrates the click streams collected across both studies for the same videos.
We could imagine that some activity threshold could be applied to data streams like
this, to determine whether a particular section of video should be investigated further.
Of course other methods known in the crowdsourcing community are relevant here, in-
cluding traditional methods where one set of workers tags events and a second set of
workers votes on those tags. Such developments are hybrid systems that could poten-
tially cope with both live and non-live analysis, as we noted earlier, but would raise
important questions about how to build trust in the work that is collected. One such hy-
brid system for video analysis was proposed by Velastin [28] where image processing
is proposed as a first layer of processing to be supplemented by human judgement in
cases that require further action.
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11 Study Limitations
As with any research there are a number of limitations to our empirical work. The over-
all context that we attempted to model was that of a real platform asking participants to
analyse real CCTV footage. As our videos did not contain any actual crime, any sense
of intrinsic motivation felt by our participants may have been short lived, as such, our
results provide the most reliable insight into the role of extrinsic motivators. Also, de-
spite the lack of crime in the videos, the underlying strategies that participants would
employ to spot events are likely to be similar, giving us confidence that we did model re-
alistic video search behaviour under our different conditions. Future community-based
studies could provide more reliable insight into the role of intrinsic motivators on such
platforms. While the levels of activity within CCTV feeds can be diverse depending on
the context, our videos represented a best-case scenario for the participants as events of
interest were relatively frequent, this means that for video feeds where events are less
frequent (or non-existent), designers could treat our results as an upper bound for accu-
racy or participation. Design decisions that we made on our platform could also have
impacted the alarm raising behaviour of participants, for example, participants were not
penalised for generating false alarms which may have led to a more liberal approach to
raising them.
12 Conclusion
The recent rise in the number of web platforms that publish CCTV video should sharpen
our focus as a research community as to whether this approach is a lazy form of secu-
rity, or whether citizen participation can indeed yield security benefits. In this paper we
took the first steps in this debate. We conducted two user studies on MTurk to explore
the impact of financial bonus, surveillance video complexity, and video navigation in-
terface upon the ability of the crowd to analyse surveillance video. We discovered that,
across our two experiments, considerations of video complexity were most important;
higher bonus payments did not encourage higher accuracy and that, for retrospective
surveillance, matching video search interfaces to the video type is crucial to influence
performance. We also noted that designers must be clear about the nature of the partic-
ipation that is desired from the crowd, particularly with regard to whether a precision
or recall focused strategy should be prioritised for event detection. Finally, we suggest
there is a need to better understand the security and privacy experiences [7] that may
accompany wider deployment of these infrastructures. There is an opportunity for plat-
forms of this type to act as a democratising force to the imposition of visual surveillance
in our societies, but future research is needed to determine whether future platforms can
live up to this challenge, or will simply serve to further erode privacy.
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